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Google+One approach to dealing with privacy would be to extend property rights to cover information or personal data, rather as copyright, patents, trademarks, and other forms of intellectual property extended physical rules into the realm of the intangible. While there are undoubtedly benefits to this, there are limitations as well
Fourth Amendment
Benefits of viewing the right to privacy as a property right
If a core reason that copyright has always been compatible with the First Amendment is that it is a property right, then perhaps a way out of the conflict between privacy and freedom of speech and the press is to conceive of privacy in the same way–as a property right. Certainly it is already on its way there, as the “right of publicity” in many jurisdictions already implicitly does so, since it provides control over unauthorized commercial use by others.
Daniel Solove’s six general types of privacy
Daniel J. Solove’s 2008 book, Understanding Privacy, attempts to characterize and understand the complex and contradictory modern views and approches to privacy. For Solove, “[p]rivacy concerns and protections do not exist for their own sake; they exist because they have been provoked by particular problems” and it “is protection from a cluster of related problems that impinge upon our activities in related ways.”
Privacy as secrecy and privacy as autonomy
The concept of “privacy”–as in “the right to privacy”–can be understood in a number of ways. This multitude of potential meanings and uses is partly why the concept is controversial, confusing, and perhaps even contradictory. Previously I have discussed the difference in perceptions of privacy in the 19th century, where the legal focus seemed to be more on “confidentiality” than what we have come to understand as “privacy” today. That is, the 19th century concern was with maintaining trust relationships between people rather than with protecting either secrecy or autonomy (although that is not to say that these were not valued).
Thinking about privacy and the First Amendment
This post is about Eugene Volokh’s article on free speech and privacy in relation to Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis’s 1890 law review article, “The Right to Privacy.” This highly influential piece advocated for “the fundamental right to be let alone.” But is it impossible to reconcile such a right with an equally compelling right to free speech?
Presenting “Privacy & The Telegraph”
A slideshow presentation of my talk on the shifting views on privacy, from the nineteenth century’s focus on property and relationships to the twentieth’s focus on people as having an individual right to privacy.
Confidentiality vs. privacy
In the law, there is a difference between confidentiality and privacy, and it’s a difference that’s important for both legal history (highlighted by the 20th century focus on the right to privacy in American law, as opposed to a 19th century focus on confidentiality) and contemporary law.
Were telegrams privileged communications?
With the introduction of the telegraph in the 1800s, some jurists, recognizing the growing importance of telegraphic communication, advocated for a kind of “telegraph operator-customer” privilege.
The long-forgotten “mere evidence” rule
The “mere evidence” rule, forbidding searches for documents that were themselves not “instrumentalities” crimes (or contraband themselves) lasted well into the twentieth century before being abandoned. So why were telegrams never explicitly covered by the rule?
An argument for the “Inviolability of Telegraphic Correspondence”
Former Michigan Supreme Court Justice Thomas M. Cooley, in a forward-looking article, advocated for extending Fourth Amendment protections to telegrams in 1879. Cooley articulated a position that both foreshadowed 20th century arguments over telephone wiretaps, and reflected his late 19th century concerns.
The slow pace of Fourth Amendment change
In Protections for Electronic Communications: the Stored Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, Alexander Scolnik wrote:
As technology evolves, giving individuals new forms of communicating and government agents increasingly sophisticated tools for surveillance, courts have had to continually interpret the Fourth Amendment and define the extent of its reach in light of these new advances.
The Fourth Amendment: from property to people
For the Fourth Amendment–the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure–one of these foundational cases was Entick v. Carrington (1765). It was not until Katz in 1965 that the Supreme Court returned to the tradition of ex Parte Jackson and held that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”
What was the “right to privacy” in 1948?
It took nearly 50 years for Justice Brandeis’ ground-breaking law review article on the right to privacy to begin to widely influence judicial decisions. By 1948, though, a dozen or so states had begun to recognize the right as a part of common law.
Constitutionalizing the sanctity of the mails
Anuj C. Desai explains that the extension of the Fourth Amendment to cover postal mail, and then later to telephones, is based not so much on the inherently Constitutional nature of opening mail, but instead on the increasingly firm belief in the sanctity of the mail as expressed by Congress, legislators, and the public.
New technologies lead to new constitutional protections
The boom in transportation and communications technologies in the nineteenth century outpaced the pace of legal change. It was only through the emergence of new concerns around both privacy and confidentiality that people themselves began to realize their importance in a way never before imagined.
Law of privacy vs. confidentiality in the nineteenth century
According to Richards and Solove the “right to privacy” as we now understand it actually grew out of an earlier recognition of the right to confidentiality in certain situations. Warren and Brandeis then took this original principle of confidentiality and shifted it to focus on a newly developed right to privacy.
