Given this focus on press invasions, it is unsurprising that many scholars have seen their proposed new tort as interfering with the First Amendment guarantees of press freedoms. (See, e.g., Lorelai Van Wey’s Note, “Private Facts Tort: The End is Here.”) Ben Bratman’s 2002 law review article, “Brandeis & Warren’s ‘The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right to Privacy’” discusses the background of this issue in light of “the considerable focus that Brandeis and Warren placed on the print media and its alleged violations of privacy” (636).

In 1890, when Warren and Brandeis’ published their article, the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights had yet to be applied to the states, although many states had their own versions. Despite this, in many ways “freedom of speech and the press” was viewed in stronger terms then than now (despite the fact that the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 was never challenged by the Supreme Court). There was, for example, no perceived difference between commercial and political speech–both were granted the same level of protection. The nineteenth century juries Thomas Cooley’s position on the issue was generally considered the most persuasive:

The constitutional liberty of speech and ofthe press, as we understand it, implies a right to freely utter and publish whatever the citizen may please, and to be protected against any responsibility for so doing, except so far as such publications, from their blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public offense, or as by their falsehood and malice they may injuriously affect the standing, reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals. (Bratman 637)

Warren and Brandeis were not unaware of this potential conflict, and carved out an exception to their proposed tort by adding a

“public interest” or “public character” exception to their tort, which recognized that the press or commercial photographers had to be free to record and report the actions of public characters and officials (Bratman 636)

In other words, even Warren and Brandeis, despite their argument that they were not inventing anything new at all, recognized that the right to privacy they were articulating had the potential to conflict with the guarantees of the First Amendment.

In their twenty-eight page piece, Brandeis and Warren chastised the journalists o f their day, particularly photojournalists, for prying into people’s private lives in search oqawdry and alluring “news,” and then made a cogent plea for the law to recognize a right to privacy and to impose liability in tort for these and other types of invasions of privacy. They got what they wanted–and more. (Bratman 624)

Much of their argument focused on limiting the public dissemination of private details of a person’s life, a goal that many find to conflict with First Amendment protections of speech and the press. But Warren and Brandeis saw the right to privacy as articulating an existing principle that had already been applied in many other contexts without constitutional problems: protections of one’s home, prohibitions of the publication of one’s private papers, and prohibitions against slander and libel.

Warren and Brandeis began their article by discussing the well-settled protections afforded by the common law to both people and property. The argued that the law had responded to “social, political, and economic changes” by expanding what it protected, such that the law now protected not just against battery, but the threat of battery (assault), as well as assaults on reputation (slander and libel) and even intangible “products of the mind,” like copyright and goodwill (Bratman 630).

The starting point of their critique of existing protections is the press:

The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and the vicious, but has become a trade. … To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. (Warren and Brandeis 196)

Warren and Brandeis proceed to reason that privacy deserves protection through analogy to existing law. Thus, the rights to “intellectual and artistic property” were “instances and applications of a general right to privacy.” In the case of copyright, for example, what is protected is not the quality of the writing or its artistic value: the “existence of the right [does not] depend upon the nature or value of the thought or emotion … [as] the same protection is accorded to a casual letter or an entry in a diary.” Thus, just because a photograph of me does not have artistic value does not mean it should not be protected, since its protection arises from being me, not from the effort invested by the photographer nor from its potential status as an important commentary on life. Even if I send a letter to someone else, they do not have the write to publish it without my consent. The underlying goal is to allow an individual to control the dissemination of what is, fundamentally, theirs. But it is not a property right in the traditional sense, and is not about physical possession or trespass:

The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality (205).

And the invasion of privacy, they continue, is like the “injuries sustained … by an attack upon reputation … or a violation of honor.” In each case the injury is non-physical, but real, and similar injuries are already punishable by law. In short, “existing law affords a principle which may be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual” (206).

“Roman law” by Eugene Yurevich. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

It is a law-school maxim today that the United States is a common-law country, while most of Europe uses civil law: English-derived common law has as its most basic tenet the binding nature of judicial precedent, while Roman-derived civil law privileges statutes. But the more I investigate the history and details of each, the more clear it becomes to me that the United States, at least, owes (almost?) as much of its legal system to civil law as it does to “pure” common law (see, e.g., Civil law and courts of equity: the common law is hybrid law and Civil law’s influence on American common law: the appeal).

Another interesting story of the influence of civil law involves a push early on in the history of the United States to bring in civil law approaches, in part as a means to distinguish American law from English law, as well as to help unify the laws of disparate states. Then as now, too, civil law–which emphasizes statutory rules over judicial lawmaking–was seen to reduce the potentially arbitrary power of an unelected judiciary.

In “The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America,” Peter Stein quotes Sir Henry Maine as saying in 1856 that the Unites States was not part of “the common-law camp,” but instead had ceased to adhere to the single English (or New English) common-law model by 1825 (403). Instead, claimed Maine, Roman law was “fast becoming the lingua franca of universal jurisprudence” as many newer American states were looking to it for their “substratum” instead of English common law (404).

Early legal education, both in America and in England, contained civil-law materials, including Justinian’s Digests and Institutes, along with treatises (in English translation) on international and natural law by Grotius and Pufendorf, among others (405). Also, many early American legal educators were Scots, and Scotland is a civil-law country (405). James Madison, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson all engaged with the civil-law tradition in their educations (405–06).

Unlike the perceive chaos of the common law, “[i]n eighteenth century eyes the civil law was associated with order, clarity and coherence” (406). After the Revolution, there was a sense that the United States needed its own legal approach based on the best the world had to offer:

efforts should be made to develop a particular American jurisprudence, which would not be a slavish imitator of the English common law, but would be eclectic–selecting the best principles and methods from whatever system they might be found in (407).

Additionally, although the common law had been seen as a check to the King’s power, it was also viewed with “considerable distrust … as an English product and a corresponding sympathy for things French” (410). Is it any wonder, then, with this desire to create a new nation, along with the positive perception of civil law, that civil law influenced early American jurists?

In the early part of the nineteenth century, American judges cited approvingly to both English legal precedent and to civil law treatises: “in New York, at least, they adopted a policy of eclecticism, considering the common-law and civil-law authorities respectively and then choosing one or the other” (409).

Especially in the areas of commercial law, maritime law, and international law, the civil law was particularly influential. English commercial law was revolutionized by Lord Mansfield in the period just before and after the Revolution, but his influence had little impact initially on the new nation (412). Instead, jurists turned to well-developed mercantile principles in civil law. In maritime and international law, Roman law–since so many European nations based their system on it–had especially force, and continue to do so today (421).

Although English precedent and English cases were used extensively in early America, early nineteenth century jurists lacked today’s judges antipathy to foreign precedent and approaches. Caleb Cushing wrote in the early 1800s:

The common, civil, and customary law of Europe have each precisely the same force with us in this branch; that is, our courts study them all, and adopt from them whatever is most applicable to our situation, and whatever is on the whole just and expedient, without considering either of course obligatory (422).

But by 1850, writes Stein, civil law had faded from American consciousness. Why?

1. The most zealous champions of the civil law held high office, but their ideas “never permeated down to the humdrum practitioner of the law.”
2. Codifiers of American law continued to turn to civil law statutes as models, but not to its general unifying principles; they looked instead to its practical implementations (like the Code Napoleon), and drew on English thinkers like Jeremy Bentham instead of Justinian.
3. Historians of Roman law then took over, emphasizing “questions of learned jurisprudence” and not “point[s] of great practical import.” (432)

Nonetheless, even though Stein sees the 1840s as the decline of civil law’s influence in America, I see point 2, above, as indicative that it continued to play a role in the development of American statutes–but one that is less obvious and more subtle than direct cites to civil-law authorities by American judges.

For this reason, Bracton’s thirteenth-century treatise On the Laws and Customs of England “reflected the canonist [i.e., the civil law] rule … that ‘one must judge not by examples but by reasons’” (see “The Transformation of English Legal Science” by Harold Berman and Charles Reid, Jr., ):

Cases, that is, judicial decisions, could be used to illustrate legal principles, but were not themselves an authoritative source of law. … If a judge did not approve of a previous decisions, or even of a previous custom of the court, he might say it was wrong and disregard it. (445)

In the seventeenth century, this began to change. Edward Coke began some of the first modern compendiums of judicial decisions, connecting the reasoning for new cases to the authority granted by previous decisions. But this was still not binding precedent, and Coke “would reach out for anything said by a judge in an earlier case if it seemed to him to reflect a true legal principle” (447). In other words, Coke made precedent more authoritative, but the ultimate search was still for universal principles. 

The eighteenth century jurist Matthew Hale saw prior decisions as evidence of the true principle or rule (448). But judicial decisions themselves “did not make a Law properly so-called, (for that only the King and Parliament can do)” (448). In other words, judges “do not ‘make’ laws, but ‘find’ them in the received legal tradition, and ‘declare’ them” (448). Modern judicial precedent–strict stare decisis, requiring lower courts to follow previous decisions (but not dictum)–did not emerge until the nineteenth century. Before this, it was a “line of cases” that mattered, not a particular holding. Judicial custom matters because it involves multiple decisions over time. Thus, in 1762, Lord Mansfield still maintained that “[t]he reason and spirit of cases make law; not the letter of particular precedents” (449).

Berman and Reid summarize the development of precedent as follows:

1. common lawyers had always discussed cases and opinions, and did not simply look to written statutes;
2. but prior to the sixteenth century, they had “no doctrine of precedent,” and only in the seventeenth century developed a version of persuasive authority largely confined to procedure and custom;
3. Coke and others challenged the King by using pre-Tudor precedents, and thus brought precedent forward as an important part of common-law decisions;
4. but common-law courts avoided binding precedent still, and looked to prior decisions to extract the principles of judicial custom, but began to apply precedent to both procedural and substantive matters;
5. at the end of the seventeenth century, common-law courts continued to develop doctrines involving precedent, especially distinguishing dicta from holdings to extract principles that could apply to the past and the future: “the principle of precedent was a dynamic and not a static one” (450).

Berman and Reid further tie the development of precedent to scientific and empirical developments of the Enlightenment as well. Even as Robert Boyle and Isaac Newtown emphasized reason and evidence in their scientific pursuits, so too did English jurists seek the “professional verification and acceptance of empirical observation” (450). Thus, repeated applications of similar approaches became good empirical evidence for the validity of a rule, “just as the repeated confirmation of the results of scientific experiments by physicists and chemists was treated as proof of the probable truth of their findings” (451).

Sir William Blackstone (1723–1780) via Wikimedia

One reason to examine the reception of English common law in the American colonies is the reliance by modern originalists (like Antonin Scalia) on the generalized understandings of what the Constitution meant in light of its common-law context. But finding that stability may not be as easy as it might seem, at least in part because jurists of the time were, in many ways, as sophisticated as we are today in arguing with, against, and around precedent–which itself was hardly either stable or fixed.

In Towards a Common Law Originalism, Bernadette A. Meyler writes:

A certain self-consciousness, furthermore, characterized common law jurisprudence of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a self-consciousness that undermines the view–expressed by Justice Scalia, among others–that we became aware judges made rather than discovered law only with the legal realists. … [But] this distinction may not entirely hold up; early common lawyers were hardly less disingenuous than their contemporary counterparts. (7)

Key in Meyler’s analysis are three points: (1) that the originalist approach rejects the jurisprudence of the common law, but endorses William Blackstone’s summation of particular precepts of eighteenth-century common law; (2) the falsity of the claim that, at the time of the Founding, the common law was “uniform throughout the nation (rather than different from state to state)” (a quote from Scalia, although to be fair he is speaking of the prevailing view in the early 18th century, not necessarily his view of that time); and (3) common law jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth century centuries–although perhaps purporting to “discover” rather than “create” law–in fact engaged in fairly self-conscious processes of law-making when participating in common law adjudication (8).

Blackstone

According to Meyler, Justice Scalia relies heavily on Blackstone’s Commentaries:

Scalia consistently emphasizes eighteenth-century English common law, and the work of Blackstone, only secondarily alluding to any developments in the colonies or the states, and generally for the purpose of confirming or substantiating the applicability of Blackstone’s statements. (11; see, e.g., 518 U.S. 415, 452)

But the Commentaries were not “simply a synopsis of existing doctrine”: first, Blackstone intended them for a lay audience; second, “he aimed through them to show legislators the problems with the state of the common law so that they might be inclined to exercise their statutory authority in amending it” (12).

Thomas Jefferson, for example, wrote that the Commentaries were “nothing more than an elegant digest of what [students] will have acquired from the real fountains of the law” (18; “Letter to Judge Tyler”). Additionally, in the 1760s, “the common law itself was on the wane, and parliamentary supremacy had been definitively established” (12). In relation to the United States, Blackstone wrote at a time when the American colonies had already substantially received English common law: “as a result, Blackstone’s vision of the relationship between statutory and common law may not accurately represent the indigenous American tradition” (12).

The Uniformity of the Common Law

Justice Scalia has emphasized that specific common law meanings are generally identifiable:

[Scalia] established a fairly strong presumption of common law unity, suggesting that litigants must argue strenuously for the proposition that a single common law meaning did not inhere in a term or phrase because of divergent or conflicting strands … This emphasis on a singular original meaning is correlated with an account of the common law at the time of the Founding as a monolithic body unaffected by statutory developments. (13–14)

Meyler goes on to explain that “writings from the Founding era and materials from the states in the period following ratification demonstrate that the common law occupied a disunified field  in late eighteenth century” (17). In other words, there was not a singular understanding of the law; the so-called “common” law was not entirely held in common at all. Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and James Madison all critically discussed the common law of their era (18). Jefferson, for example, debated whether Christianity was a part of the common law, and maintained that it was not (19). Adams argued about the temporality of the common law, and “insisted on the return to an early seventeenth-century version of the common law, that in place before the accession of Charles I” (21). He also “resisted the notions that the common law had been introduced wholesale into America,” and instead argued that only the common law that was adapted to the American context had been imported (22).

James Madison wrote a report on the basis of the common law in 1799–80, and asked several key questions that are also applicable to any uniform understanding of Constitutional meaning through reliance on the common law:

1. Is it to be the common law with or without the British statutes?
2. Is it to be the date of the eldest or the youngest of the Colonies? Or are the dates to be thrown together and a medium deduced? Or is our independence to be taken for the date?
3. Is, again, regard to be had to the various changes in the common law made by the local codes of America? (25)

While Madison went on to reject the idea of federal common law in 1824, he did endorse the necessity of interpreting the Constitution on the basis of “the Common law because it borrows therefrom terms which must be explained by Com. Law authorities” (25). For Madison, the key was that the common law helped explain concepts and terms. It provided “an interpretive tool for understanding constitutional phrases, [but] it could not … entirely dictate the meaning of many of the Constitution’s clauses” (26).

Additionally, the laws–even the “common laws”–differed between various colonies and between the colonies and England (27). There were even attempts to abrogate the “Common Law of England” on several grounds, including that the “the common law did not boast uniformity even in England” and the “disparity … between American and English versions of the common law” (28).

In effect, the common law provided useful background information to help define and understand terms and meanings, but it was not fixed enough to provide a firm foundation for a uniform, consistent interpretation of the Constitution.

Sophisticated Common Lawyers

Common lawyers at the in the eighteenth century were aware of “the mutability of common law”:

To achieve a thoroughgoing originalism, it is thus necessary to acknowledge that the flexibility of the common law method was not unknown to the Founding generation and instead provided the backdrop for the U.S. Constitution itself (33).

Key eighteenth century legal theorists–Coke, Hale, and Blackstone–based its authority both on reference to natural or universal law, as well as the historicity and popular acceptance of common law (36). Thus, precedents helps evaluate particular problems, but it takes interpretation in evaluating specific questions (40).

Suggesting the importance of contemporary acceptance in the authority of the common law, and not its universality, the English historian Matthew Hale “insisted that the continued acceptance rather than the origin of the common law was essential in endowing it with authority” (41):

This release from grounding the authority of the common law in its immemoriality enabled Hale to explicitly acknowledge legal change and to write the first account of the common law that openly presented itself as a history and spoke of the common law’s extraordinary emergencies.

If, in originalist fashion, one goes back to look at the understandings of the Founders, the result is not fuzzy view into a fixed understanding of the common law, but rather a fuzzy view into an equally fuzzy, quite sophisticated and rather (post)-modern view of the common law as mutable through time and dependent on popular acceptance for at least part of its authority.

“Visible downgrading” by Alex Wellerstein. CC BY 2.0 license.

The concept of “privacy”–as in “the right to privacy”–can be understood in a number of ways. This multitude of potential meanings and uses is partly why the concept is controversial, confusing, and perhaps even contradictory. Previously I have discussed the difference in perceptions of privacy in the 19th century, where the legal focus seemed to be more on “confidentiality” than what we have come to understand as “privacy” today. That is, the 19th century concern was with maintaining trust relationships between people rather than with protecting either secrecy or autonomy (although that is not to say that these were not valued).

Autonomy

This changed with the 1890 publication of the Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis law review article called “The Right to Privacy.” In this article, Warren and Brandeis are actually concerned with something more akin to autonomy than secrecy: “from Greek autonomia, from autonomos  ‘having its own laws,’ from autos ‘self’ + nomos ‘law’” (from Apple’s dictionary app).  That is, allowing people to control their own self-identity, rather than allowing it to be exploited by (for example) yellow journalists. Secrecy, on the other hand, is about keeping something away from the knowledge of others. The concepts are related, but distinct and different, and require different legal approaches.

“Paparazzi” by Clément Seifert. CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 licensed.

The Warren and Brandeis article advocated for the protection of a person’s “inviolate personality” and the “fundamental right to be let alone.” They were not concerned with illegal government searches of private residences–or even the trespasses of journalists in private land–but rather with the publication and dissemination of information that, they believed, most properly belonged to a person. In other words, their approach was akin to a broad notion of copyright or “right of publicity,” because it proposed allowing people to control the publication of their own likeness (photos of themselves, for example). Such control was based on a kind of “moral right,” in a sense, to own one’s own self, or to be “autonomous.” The implications of a right to control the publication of information about one’s self has the potential to conflict with the First Amendment rights of others in a way that a right to privacy as secrecy might not.

In 1928, now a Supreme Court justice, Brandeis wrote in dissent in Olmstead v. U.S. that the right to privacy was the “right to be left alone–the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by a free people.” Cornell’s Legal Information Institute explains that the right to privacy has thus “developed into a liberty of personal autonomy protected by the 14th amendment.” The focus on a “right to privacy” as “a liberty of personal autonomy” is why the Fourteenth Amendment (due process and equal protection), and not the Fourth Amendment (search and seizure), is often so important today when discussing privacy, and is the constitutional underpinning for key decisions like Roe v. Wade.

Secrecy

“Completely Tapped” by Byung Kyu Park. CC BY-SA 2.0 license.

A right to secrecy is most closely aligned with the Fourth Amendment (search and seizure) and with trespass, and less with the “penumbra” of due process or equal protection. A right to keep things secret is also about “inviolability” in some sense. Thus, in Olmstead, Brandeis could argue that a wiretap could intrude on a “right to privacy”–the “right to be let alone”–as part of a violation of the Fourth Amendment, even though no publication or dissemination had necessarily occurred. A right to autonomy, to protect one’s self, might well require a right to secrecy in a case involving wiretaps, but it has less value in protecting abortion rights, for example, where the real question is one of self-determination, not secrecy.

Approaching a right to secrecy legally, one might prosecute an overzealous journalist not for the publication of embarrassing information–and certainly not for photos taken in public places–but for a trespass involved in obtaining private letters. In some cases, the First Amendment might still be implicated (think of the Pentagon Papers), but the restraint on speech is much weaker when what is being restricted is not directly the publication of materials, but rather the manner in which they were obtained.

In this sense, then, data privacy laws–which Eugene Volokh, for example, has explained are in many ways in conflict with the First Amendment–might be more readily disentangled from that constitutional problem if they are realigned with traditional laws against trespass. The law, then, would not be focused on preventing publication (although that might be an issue still, and might still have First Amendment implications), but rather on punishing transgressions or trespasses.

Jack M. Balkin, from the Knight Foundation. CC BY-SA 2.0.

In “Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society,” Jack Balkin (of the blog Balkinization) writes about what he sees as the appropriation of free speech ideals by media corporations in an effort to maximize their capital investments:

Thus, in the digital age, media corporations have interpreted the free speech principle broadly to combat regulation of digital networks and narrowly in order to protect and expand their intellectual property rights. … Invoking a property-based theory of free expression, they have rejected arguments that public regulation is necessary to keep conduits open and freely available to a wide variety of speakers. (22)

Balkin sees this as reminiscent of a similar appropriation during the first Gilded Age of the 1870s and 1880s especially, when the “robber barons” grew wealthy and strong. Corporations of the time lobbied (and won) for new property rights and new constitutional protections against employment regulations (24). The abolitionists and others had celebrated the freedom to labor for whom one chose as a rejection of slavery; the corporations reinterpreted this as the “freedom of contract,” and used it to prevent government labor regulations (24). So, for example, when Congress passed a child labor law in 1916, the courts–drawing on the freedom of contract now enshrined as a principle in the Constitutional theory of the day–struck it down two years later (in Hammer v. Dagenhart).

Bilkin writes:

In what Clinton Rossiter called the “Great Train Robbery of Intellectual History,” laissez-faire conservatives appropriated the words and symbols of early nineteenth-century liberalism–liberty, opportunity, progress, and individualism–and gave them an economic reinterpretation that served corporate interests. … By the turn of the twentieth century, the best legal minds that money could buy had reshaped the liberal rights rhetoric of the 1830s into a powerful conservative defense of property that they claimed was the rightful heir to the best American traditions of individualism and personal freedom. (24–25)

Today, Bilkin said, we’re seeing a similar move: “The right to speak has been recast as a right to be free from business regulation” (25). Corporations have moved to extend copyright, making it both broader (covering more) and longer (lasting for 70+ years instead of the original fourteen years of 1790. ) They have also argued that networks should be freer than ever of government regulation, because such regulations–passed in the name of protecting the public’s speech–infringes on their freedom of speech.

(Interesting note: this move–discussed in Balkin’s 2004 article–is very similar to what happened with corporate money and speech in the 2010 Citizen’s United decision.)

1. that English common law was in force in the colonies from the time of the first English settlement;
2. that, quoting Paul S. Reinsch, the colonies “underwent ‘a period of rude, untechnical popular law, followed, as lawyers became numerous and the study of law prominent, by the gradual reception of most of the rules of English common law’”;
3. or instead, citing Julius Goebel, that the colonists instead adopted the “customary law of the local courts the colonists had known in England” and not the common law “of the king’s courts at Westminster.”

Before discussing the historical record, Stoebeck first bookends the problem by noting that, first, “there was no common law in America on 12 May 1607″ and, second, there are case reports and so on available post-Revolution that provide solid insight on where “common-law reception … must have stood on Independence Day” (395–96).

A lack of lawyers

In the 17th century, there was a paucity of lawyers in the colonies. There were very few English-trained lawyers in Massachussetts, only three were known to be in Connecticut, one in Maine, thirty-some-odd in Virginia, two in Maryland, and none anywhere else (405). With no law schools, no real bar, and no real apprenticeship possibilities, there were likely few, if any, American-trained colonial lawyers either. Kermit Hall’s 1989 book reinforces this:

Antilawyer sentiment was pervasive elsewhere as well, and the “ancient English prejudice against lawyers secured new strength in America.” The framers of the Fundamental Constitutionsof the Carolinas in 1669 declared it a “base and vile thing to plead for money or reward.” Connecticut and Virginia during a portion of the seventeenth century prohibited lawyers from practicing. (Hall 21–22)

As a result of the limited availability of trained lawyers, Stoebeck suggests that it’s unlikely that the colonists would have adopted or used the complex English common-law system in anything other than a limited manner.

What law?

Even when charters of the new colonies referenced the laws of England, Stoebeck points out, there is an additional problem: which laws of England? According to Edward Coke, a 17th-century jurist, lists fourteen types of law in England: “the law of the crown, law of parliament, law of nature, statute law, customs, ecclesiastical law, etc., of which the ‘common law of England’ was only one” (397).

Even contemporary discussions of the “common law” in the 17th century often did not clearly distinguish what was meant. Colonists, for example, would clamor for the protections of the “common law of England” when resisting unpopular or autocratic actions by English or colonial governments. They were not, however, advocating for the “king’s law,” nor for the common-law writ system, but rather for what we might consider today to be Constitutional protections, like a right to a trial by jury (410).

Every colony is different

Stoebeck explores the complexities of the various colonies, each of which has a different foundation story and a different relationship with England. Virginia, for example, was founded by an English corporation and intended to benefit investors back in England, while Massachusetts was founded by religious dissidents who often preferred Biblical precedent. As a result, it’s hard to speak of a single “reception” in America.

1700 is a turning point

Nonetheless, Stoebeck suggests that the turn of the eighteenth century marked a turning point for all the colonies (407, 410). The 1696 Navigation Act, for example, imposed much more clearly English legal control over admiralty jurisdiction in the colonies (408). The Privy Council began examining court procedures and the Council of Trade and Plantations began to exert pressure to codify colonial laws (409). (I should note, too, that the first Virginia Slave Code dates from 1705, and other slave codes were enacted from the 1660s into the early 1700s.)

Conclusions

Stoebeck clearly rejects the first theory of common-law adoption (that it was applied from the moment of settlement), since most of his historical discussions involve the complex ways in which English common law was not in use in the colonies before the Revolution. But beyond that, his account explores a variety of paths that each different colony took. Some more quickly adopted English practices than others, and all began to do so more at the turn of the 18th century, but none fully adopted English practice until late in the century (if they even did then). Some did apply more local custom and practice as used at home in England, others used indigenous procedures and approaches, and all codified distinct statutory laws.

But whatever their path, by the end of the 18th century the colonies–now the United States–explicitly adopted English common law (even if what that was, exactly, wasn’t always clear) through statute or in their Constitutions, and jurists used English precedent into the 19th century (and occasionally today, too).

Stoebeck ends his account by saying,

The reception process had been very much an indigenous affair, for the English home government had acted only haltingly to impose adoption of the common law.

And, finally, he says,

The post-Revolutionary evidence makes it nigh conclusive that Chief Justice Daniel Horsmanden spoke not only  for New York but of colonial America when he said in 1765 that the court applied the common law ‘in the main.’”

Thus, the end of the reception story is “secure,” even if the story of the process “has some missing planks.”

By Robert Horwitz

Robert Horwitz’s The Irony of Regulatory Reform: The Deregulation of American Telecommunications, published in 1989, explores in depth the issue of telecommunications regulation at a time when telecommunications was once again in transition. My own interest is in the revolutions in communications technologies that occurred with the spread of American post offices in the 18th century, the telegraph in the 19th, and the telephone–and then radio, TV, and cable–in the 20th. Horwitz writes:

Telecommunications constitutes one of the four essential modes or channels that permit trade and discourse among members of a society, the other three being transportation, energy utilities, and the system of currency exchange, or money. … These services are “connective” institutions. They are central to the circulation of capital and literally constitute both the foundation and the limit for the overall functioning of a society. This is why … they are called infrastructures.

In 1989, deregulation of industries overseen by agencies created during the New Deal was in full swing. The irony for Horwitz is that “deregulation has most strongly affected those regulatory agencies whose actions have been least odious to business.” Thus, agencies created later and earlier than the New Deal were largely unaffected.

History

Looking backwards, Horwitz says that the “emergency of regulatory agencies constituted the building of a national administrative structures in a state which had been institutionally localistic and court-centered.” He argues that in the 19th century, the courts provided the oversight of economic development that would eventually be taken over by modern administrative agencies. This changed in the 1890s, after laissez-faire economic principles had created “a general crisis of social control.” The era of big business necessitated an (eventual) government response.

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The Progressive Era saw the first new regulatory bodies emerge, largely “in response to popular political activism.” This gave us what would become the Food and Drug Administration, the Justice Department’s antitrust division, and the Federal Trade Commission. New Deal agencies, on the other hand, were created to bring stability to specific markets, and was generally greeted with enthusiasm by businesses desperate for such stability. In the 1960s and 70s, the regulatory focus shifted to more general social protections, especially of citizens as a whole. This was the era of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

The New Regulatory Agencies of the 20th Century

Regulatory agencies of the 20th century are a new phenomenon. According to Horwitz,

Regulatory agencies constitute a new structure of federal political power in the American political system; they represent a mixture of legislative, executive, and judicial functions.

In the American system of separated powers, they are an odd delegation of Congressional power: legislatively created, administered by the executive branch, and often given quasi-judicial responsibilities to hear and decide cases (with judicial review, of course, the level of which has varied over time).

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While industry regulation serves a certain level of private interest–especially in the creation of stability–much regulation involves what Horwitz calls the “public interest”: “something larger, something more general.” Although the 20th-century regulatory agency was a new beast in the United States, “the construction and maintenance of infrastructures usually have been the responsibility of governments” as far back as 13th-century England (in the Anglo-American tradition, at least–but remember that the Roman state built aqueducts and roads much earlier, for example).

In the United States, the Commerce Clause justified federal government intervention. Because this economically focused rationale underpins the American regulatory approach, Horwitz argues that, “[i]f there is a general concept of the public interest informing state intervention into infrastructure industries, it is a commerce-based concept.” Thus, in regulation transportation, “nondiscrimination” has been key. The goal? To ensure “[t]hat carriers would serve the needs of commerce rather than inhibit commerce.”

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In telecommunications, the “common carrier principle is really little more than a commerce-based notion of the public interest.” It “guaranteed access to the means of transmission.” Granting individual people access was really just “a logical extension of expanding the marketplace.” But despite this limited original impetus, “common carrier law embraces principles broader than commerce” as it made the telephone “available (in principle) to all citizens.”

Liberty

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Telecommunications, though, involves essential aspects of liberty, especially the ideals of “free speech” embodied in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Freedom of commerce does connect to freedom of speech is historically linked to the liberal (in the tradition of Locke and Mill) ideology of the free market. Thus, the ideology of free speech has for many years been to encourage the “marketplace of ideas.” The assumption, says Horwitz, is that “a democratic public sphere will emerge consequent to the unimpeded, private actions of speech-entrepreneurs.”

But what happens when those “speech-entrepreneurs” are a few powerful corporations who demand significant money to utilize their infrastructure? The result can be that “those with wealth can disseminate their views, the First Amendment ‘right’ of most citizens is merely to listen and read. Yet a free marketplace of ideas implies dialogue.”

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Today we have the Internet and the World Wide Web, which have the potential to turn everyone into contributors as well as consumers of information. Does this mean, then, that the natural form of these new mediums reduce of eliminate the necessity of their regulation? Or is regulation still needed to maintain a “free marketplace” of both ideas and commerce?

Deregulation

Deregulation can reduce the power of established cartels and allow for innovation and novelty: “It permits the resurgence of competition and the anarchistic play of market forces.”  This, though, is certainly not in the interest of established players–so why is modern deregulation so associated with big (entrenched) business?

Partly, says Horwitz, this is due to the divergence of “administrative rationality and economic rationality.” Regulatory agencies are conservative and bureaucratic by their nature, and the logic of rules be lost even as their enforcement continues. Irrationality–and the regulatory delay of agencies struggling to apply outdated rules to a complex environment–can lead to business uncertainty instead of stability. The burden on the regulated industries thus grows over time. This was made worse as the social goals of the 1960s and 70s created “new obligations, costs, and time delays.” The result? Deregulation won out in many–but not all!–contexts.

Digital edition of “The Right to Privacy”

Part of the historical work I’ve been doing focuses on the history of privacy and the introduction of new technologies, like the telegraph. In terms of of the U.S. Constitution, I’ve been focused mostly on the Fourth Amendment (which regulates searches and seizures). However, the First Amendment’s speech protections are also potentially implicated, especially when it comes to modern information privacy law–a point Eugene Volokh explored in his 2000 law review article, “Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?”

I am not going to as fully analyze the issue here, but I wanted to begin thinking about it. To do this, I’m going to think about Volokh’s points in relation to Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis’s 1890 law review article, “The Right to Privacy.” This highly influential piece advocated for “the fundamental right to be let alone.” But is it impossible to reconcile such a right with an equally compelling right to free speech?

Of course, the right to “free speech” is not an absolute right, and there are many constraints (yelling “fire” in a crowded theater is, of course, classic). But still, the requirement that the government “shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” is explicitly written in the Constitution, whereas the “right to privacy” is part of its “penumbra.” So perhaps the debate is easier for originalists like Antonin Scalia, who can end the debate by asserting that the original meaning of the Constitution does not include a right to privacy, but it does include a free speech provision.

The Warren and Brandeis article attacks the new gossip columns and photographs made possible by new technologies of the era. They connect their argument for the protection of a person’s “inviolate personality” to the protections afforded, via copyright for example, to “personal writings and all other personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any form” (206).

Volokh quickly dispenses with arguments that copyright, despite its restrictions on speech, is itself barred by the First Amendment, primarily on the grounds that courts have not allowed “intellectual property owners the power to suppress facts” (1065, citing to Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises). Thus, I may publish a cutting-edge exploration of new historical materials I spent years digging out of the archives and while you may not simply photocopy and redistribute my work, you can write your own work drawing on all the labor I spent bringing forth these new facts. (See also, “You do not get an ‘A for effort’ with copyright.”)

But do I have a right to prevent the publication of personal facts about me, however embarrassing they may be? (Remember, copyright protects my creative expression, not the bare facts themselves, so it’s no help here.) What about restrictions on publishing my criminal history? Or my video rental history? Or  my credit card purchasing history?

If I obtain these items via a contractual arrangement, Volokh says, there is no problem, because enforcing contractual restrictions on speech does not offend the Constitution. But what if I get them without agreeing to a contract? Can the government still prohibit their publication? Volokh says there is a problem here (1092–94).

Very often, free speech protections are analyzed under a “marketplace of ideas” paradigm. In this analysis, we need speech–and allowing it is good–because it contributes to our ability to make decisions, and the greater the marketplace, the better decisions we can make. Bad ideas are countered by more speech, not by restricting their entry into the marketplace.

My criminal history and credit card history are certainly good information to have if you are evaluating me for a job or elected office, so in a marketplace analysis, they shouldn’t be suppressed. But there is a realm of “non-public-concern” topics that can be restricted (accidental nudity, for example)–but Volokh suggests this is too slippery of a concept to function as an effective test (1094–95).

Government can regulate speech if there is a “compelling state interest” (1106). Is privacy protection sufficiently compelling? Relatedly, is the penumbra-derived right to privacy sufficient to counter free speech arguments?

Volokh argues that privacy rights are “statutory or common-law” derived, and are not “analogous to a constitutional right” (1108). Furthermore, the First Amendment only prevents government interference with speech, not private actions to interfere with it; thus, privacy rights might well only protect against government violations, not allow for government to regulate non-government interference with privacy.

Volokh attacks Warren and Brandeis most directly when he writes:

On the other hand, if the claim is that the ability of private parties to communicate personal information about others
by itself “destroy[s] individual dignity and integrity and emasculate[s] individual freedom and independence,” “deprive[s people] of [their] individuality,” makes it impossible for “intimate relationships [to] exist,” or denies that a person’s “existence is his own,” such a claim is simply false.

This is pretty close to the argument that Warren and Brandeis make when they attack gossip columns. But even if the claim is true, Volokh says restricting publication to protect this is unconstitutional:

Under current constitutional doctrine, the answer seems to be no. Though the Supreme Court has sometimes left open the door to the possibility of restricting truthful speech simply on those grounds, the general trend of the cases cuts against this: Even offensive, outrageous, disrespectful, and dignity-assaulting speech is constitutionally protected.

It seems to me pretty clear that Volokh does not agree with Warren and Brandeis. I still think there’s potential for an alternative approach that might allow for certain kinds of privacy protection without overly violating the U.S.‘s very strong speech protections (note that this isn’t a problem generally in Europe, which permits much greater restrictions on speech when it serves as a protection against, for example, Nazism), but it’s not yet obvious to me what approach would be.

Related articles

• Knowingly False Statements of Fact and the First Amendment (volokh.com)