One pertinent example: most biologists look at the diversity of species and say that evolution by natural selection (with at least a hint of randomness) is the best explanation, whereas believers in Intelligent Design see God’s hand at work. Given a certain view of available evidence, both explanations might be possible (especially if an all-powerful God simply creates everything, including fossils, in situ). So how can we resolve this problem whereby a set of facts can justifiably be argued to support multiple potential theories?

One approach is to limit ourselves to certain kinds of theories as potential explanations: science tends to allow for only theories that are potentially testable, verifiable, falsifiable, etc. Most scientists say, despite arguments to the contrary, that the existence of a divine presence guiding evolution is simply out of bounds for scientific inquiry. It’s a matter for faith, not empirical inquiry; it’s religion, not science.

Of course, as John Hedley Brooke points out, the meaning of the terms “science” and “religion” has changed over time, and “it is more appropriate to speak of ‘sciences’ and ‘religions.’ When we do, any simple dichotomy loses its rigidity” (297). Thus, for example, the term “science” once included any organized body of knowledge (which would have included theology), though now it has a more specific meaning. “Religion,” too, only emerged as a useful term when “comparative approaches were needed for the analysis of different cultures … in the Enlightenment” (297). Still, the distinction is at least analytically useful, and however historically suspect, it is relied upon by most writers today.

Another approach to managing the (potentially illusory) conflict between science and religion is favored by Owen Gingerich, astronomer and author of God’s Universe. He turns to Aristotle to help differentiate two kinds of explanation put forth by science and religion. Put in Aristotelean terms, faith can be seen as a search for “final” causes, while traditional science could be said to stick instead to “efficient” causes. There is thus no conflict between science and religion, and no worries about underdetermination traceable to this conflict, since each explains different things.

Gingerich looks to Blaise Pascal’s notion that “some things only the heart knows” to explain this idea and justify his belief in (small case) “intelligent design.” Since science cannot know or determine certain truths (final causes, in Aristotelian terms), we can freely posit a (distant) intelligent designer without worrying about stepping on scientific concepts of proof. In essence, two truths become simultaneously possible, because they occupy different domains of truth. Intelligent Design (not Creationism, and not the lower-case “intelligent design” of Gingerich), on the other hand, believes that science can be used to access the truth of an intelligent creator, and that this search is scientific.

Creationism, on the other hand, tends to reject science more firmly (but not, interestingly, technology). It inherits from a tradition of the literal exegesis of scripture used, for example, in the 16th century. Of course, today’s Biblical literalism is only related to, but not identical with, 16th-century exegesis. After all, bringing in a passage of scripture today is no longer a means of shutting down debate.

So how did followers of Copernicus in the 16th century deal with the issue of causation, given the power of Biblical exegesis at the time? They did so by arguing that scripture itself underdetermines potential explanations — even if it can shut down blatantly conflicting theories. Relatedly, Johannes Kepler tried an accommodation approach with literalism. He maintained that God, in order to be understood by normal people, caused the Bible to be written in ordinary language. This is why there are no discussions of epicycles in the Bible. The Bible thus accommodates ordinary folk with a different, non-scientific vocabulary that, if read correctly, does not conflict with science.

Of course, many — most? — of today’s scientists simply step outside of the argument, and point to materialist, naturalistic explanations as being all that is necessary for science — certainly they are the only valid scientific theories — even in religion can provide different kinds of explanations (which may or may not be important to the scientists personally). And how do they often justify this? Because these explanations work. Certainly this is the approach taken by most engineers and developers of technology, and perhaps, then, this is why Christian fundamentalists and Muslims have no trouble reconciling their faith with structural engineering or software development. They focus on the science that works in a materialist sense, and not the science that raises uncomfortable questions (evolutionary biology, for instance).

Alternatively, if this approach to dealing with underdetermination is dissatisfying, then there is always the choice to go to absolute knowledge, as David Bloor reminds us: if the Pope says it’s true, then no doubt exists, and we escape the problem of underdetermination and uncertainty. The Catholic Pope is not the only option, of course. Islam, despite its lack of central authorities, also relies on the authority of absolute knowledge — revelation from the Qur’an — to solve the problem of underdetermination. Medieval Islam appears to have successfully negotiated any potential conflict between Qur’anic knowledge and scientific knowledge. Modern Islam, on the other hand, is arguably still searching for the proper balance. Modern evangelical Christianity, too, seeks a new balance between science and faith.

Porter quotes Richard Hammond’s observations:

In a country where mistrust of government is rife, the temptation to substitute supposedly impersonal calculation for personal, responsible decisions … cannot but be exceedingly strong. (195)

Porter goes on to refer to Sheila Jasanoff‘s observation that “Americans fear expertise … yet insist that administrative decisions be depoliticized” and thus “oscillate ‘between deference and skepticism toward experts’” (195). The United States — which “continues to nourish a distinguished tradition of anti-intellectualism” — paradoxically seeks “experts who are not intellectuals or men of culture at all” (195). Porter writes:

Procedures have become as important as outcomes, and rules may be maintained even though they are unable to accomodate new kinds of relevant scientific information (197).

The Courts

American courts generally emphasize process, too, encouraging the application of rules by courtroom experts: “science should mean the straightforward application of general laws to particular circumstances” (195). Attorneys attack courtroom experts for having personal opinions and unique approaches to their studies. “General acceptability” was the core component of Frye, and the modern standard for acceptance of expert testimony (Daubert) emphasizes this factor too (though it expands beyond it).

The Supreme Court’s “hard look” doctrine emphasizes this, too. That doctrine requires judicial review of agency decisions are “arbitrary and capricious.” It requires administrative agencies to maintain a proper record of evidence and actions, adequately consider evidence and various analyses, and explain their reasoning. The doctrine is not intended to emphasize outcomes, but rather to encourage objective process. Even this doctrine, aimed as it is at process and not outcomes, has been attacked as too political (i.e., not objective enough):

Administrative law doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking currently give judges a significant amount of discretion to invalidate agency rules. Many commentators have recognized that this has politicized judicial review of agency rulemaking, as judges appointed by a president of one political party are more likely to invalidate agency rules promulgated under the presidential administration of a different political party. Unelected judges, though, should not be able to use indeterminate administrative law doctrines to invalidate agency rules on the basis that they disagree with the policy decisions of a presidential administration. Keller, Scott A., “Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking,” 2009.

United States vs. Europe

The American approach — the way agencies make decisions and the way courts review those decisions — is distinctly different from how it’s done in Europe. Although they vary in their details, in general, all European approaches “are capable in some measure of formulating policies and determining how to apply them through negotiation with the interested parties, behind closed doors” (197). For good or ill, European states tend to institutionally trust their elite experts and the agencies they staff — but American agencies today lack this kind of citizen trust:

American regulatory agencies are forced to seek refuge in ‘objectivity,’ adopting formal methodologies for rationalizing their every action (197).

It hasn’t always been this way in the United States. American administrative agencies really only grew as outgrowths of the New Deal’s attempt to rationalize, control, and improve the economy during the Great Depression. These agencies — and the few that preceded them — were staffed by experts, driven by numbers, and depended on expert judgment and expertise in ways that are quite similar to their modern European counterparts (198).

Citizen Standing and Openness

The 1960s brought a new focus on citizen involvement in agency decisions. “Openness” was the “antidote to self-interest and to corruption masquerading as expertise” (198). The 1966 case, Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F. 2d 994, exemplified this trend:

This was the case that began the process of opening the regulatory and judicial processes to everyday citizens by granting legal “standing” to citizens. The expansion of standing enabled regular citizens to be heard before regulatory agencies and to bring actions in court, amplifying the amounts and types of political issues taken up in the public arena. Horwitz, Robert, “Broadcast Reform Revisited: Reverend Everett C. Parker and the ‘Standing’ Case,” The Communication Review, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1997), pp. 311-348.

Problems and Contradictions

The attempt to bring openness and greater democracy to agency decision-making succeeded in bringing greater citizen scrutiny and input to the exercise of expertise. It came as a reaction to behind-the-scenes decisions that appeared to favor established interests. Thus, citizen-activists fought against agencies that appeared too close to the companies they regulated — and often succeeded in opening up their processes.

But this didn’t necessarily result in better decisions.

Agencies responded with a greater use of, in Porter’s terms, “mechanical objectivity” in place of expert judgment. Additionally, the critiques used to attack agency expertise began to be turned against scientific and medical expertise more generally. Thus, anti-vaccination campaigners accuse medical experts of profiting from vaccines and acting as “willing conspirators cashing in on the vaccine fraud’ or pawns of a shadowy vaccine combine.” What was once an attack on an FCC that consisted of former broadcast executives has become an attack on doctors who favor broad public-health mandates and on climate scientists who warn about the dangers of human-induced climate change.

Millenarianism — the belief in the end of this world and the coming of the next — is, in Noble’s view, a key driver of early proto-scientists, at least those in seventeenth-century England. There was, he argues, a sense at the time that the Fall of Adam from Eden “could be reversed” (45).

He describes these “Puritan Baconians” and their utilitarian and millenarian outlook as giving formative shape to modern science. He argues that these early scientists were really technologists: the early founders of the “new scientific academies … tended to view science as technology … as an enterprise … bound up … with the useful arts” (57).

Connected with this utilitarian perspective, for Noble, is the strong connection between scientific pioneers and early capitalist enterprise (59). He points to Robert Boyle’s father and other early Royal Society members who “were involved in such industries as tobacco, distilling, and trade” (59).[1]

Noble suggests, though, that these “founders of modern science” eventually moved away from earlier views of recovering Eden and, “with increasingly more hubris than humility,” began to speak of achieving of an understanding of divine creation itself, instead of the lesser focus on Adam’s knowledge characteristic of earlier times (62). In other words, they moved from being content with a focus on technology and “what works” to become scientists focused on questions beyond the materialistic.

Increasingly “mechanistic scientists” began to divorce God and creation, and to view God as outside his clockwork universe. They began to imagine themselves as occupying a similar, God-like perspective, one that gazed from “outside of nature”:

For Newton, then, to uncover the hidden logic of the universe was to understand and in that sense identify with, the mind of its Creator. (63-65)

This was very different from earlier views of “God in nature” that earlier hermetic and alchemical traditions — predecessors of modern “technoscience” — held.

In short, Noble argues that these early scientists began to dispense with a humble pursuit of the divine in nature and to instead view themselves as gods (67). (Perhaps a dislike of this hubris is why he identifies himself as a modern-day Luddite and refuses to use email.)

In his descriptions of eighteenth century European science, Noble continues to emphasize the importance of millenarian beliefs to the science and technology of this time. For example, Joseph Priestly, known for his work in electricity and with oxygen, insisted on the connections between his scientific work and his religious views, which included a belief in prophecy and Revelation. Priestly focused on the “practical application of science” to further the goals of “both immediate utility and millennial preparation” (71).

But it was not just Priestly. Religious belief generally motivated early scientists in this time, according to Nobel, who writes that Michael Faraday, known for his work with electricity, was involved in a sect of fundamentalist Christianity that focused on a very literal interpretation of the Bible (71). Charles Babbage, mathematician and industrial inventor, also focused on arguments “in favor of religion” (72). For Noble, religious belief and scientific pursuits were both unified and mutally supportive — at least in the minds of eighteenth-century European scientists.

Noble next moves into what I think might be the most intriguing aspect of this section of his work: his investigation of the role Freemasonry, including its “devoutly religious” — if anticlerical — beliefs, played in fostering scientific advances and improving the “useful arts” (77).

As the eighteenth century progressed, the technological Freemasons proved to be “among the earliest advocates of industrialization” and served as “midwives” at the birth of the “latest incarnation of spiritual men, the engineer” (79). Noble writes: “As the founding fathers of both the engineering profession and engineering education, the Freemasons passed on the legacy of the religion of technology to modernity’s ‘New Man’” (79).

Moving into nineteenth-century science, Noble turns his attention to Auguste Comte and his positivist system. Positivism, he argues, is “strikingly reminiscent of the Christian goal of a transcendent recovery of mankind’s original divine image-likeness and dominion over nature” (84). As with the millenarians, writes Noble, for positivists the “world’s transformation was inevitable and imminent” (84).

Marx and the socialists shared Comte’s “technology-inspired millenariasm” and carried the old beliefs forward into a “new secular age” (86). Comte and the positivists may have rejected nineteenth-century religion as unscientific, but, according to Noble, the scientific worldview they adopted instead was remarkably like the religion it replaced.

In a later chapter he calls “The New Eden,” Noble turns to America, where he believes “the useful arts became wedded to Adamic myths and millennial dreams” as “nowhere else before or since” (88). In America, “scientific and industrial revolutions followed in the wake of religious revival” (90). Technological inventions in America carried with them religious meanings. The telegraph, for example, was viewed as “divinely inspired for the purpose of spreading the Christian message farther … bringing closer and making more probable the day of salvation” (94).

In nineteenth-century America, religion and technology were neither distinct nor disconnected; instead, they both reinforced and strengthened each other.

But despite this deep connection between technology and religion, religion in the twentieth century moved away from being a driver of both technological invention and scientific innovation. Increasingly, religion has been seen as oppositional to science and technology.

Still, for many Christians this opposition is uneccessary and even problematic. For example, Noble explains tht NASA — at least into the Shuttle years — contained many devout Christians who saw their missions to space in deeply religious terms, and saw no conflict between their scientific and religious missions.

But what can one make, then, of the Young-Earth Creationismisms rejection of geological and evolutionary sciences? Or the ongoing attempts by Christian evangelicals to “teach the controversy” of evolution in high-school classrooms? Does this kind of fight prove Noble’s integration thesis wrong?

While I don’t think Noble fully answers these questions, his focus on technology perhaps suggests an answer. Science — or at least, some kinds of science — are not easy for some modern Christians to accept. But technology, even missions to the Moon or Mars, are much more readily reconciable with faith. They are, in older terms, explorations of God’s world, not challenges to God’s supremacy.

1. Take small steps.
2. Favor reversibility.
3. Plan on surprises.
4. Plan on human inventiveness.

James C. Scott presents these four rules in his book, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, a 1998 exploration of the history of major failed state projects (like Soviet collectivization and Tanzanian forced villagization). His work focuses on the necessary (for failure) intersection of state’s seeking to order a society, a “high-modernist ideology,” the existence of sufficient state power and an authoritarian desire for control, and a civil society that doesn’t resist.

But what does this have to do with your latest project?

Even if you aren’t planning a major state project, Scott’s advice is remarkably useful for anyone:

First, take small steps.

Scott suggests a humble approach: “presume that we cannot know the consequences of our actions in advance.” To deal with this ignorance, take small actions, then step back and observe the result. If you’re moving everyone in your company to Google Docs, try a pilot project first and see how it works. If you’re moving all your servers to the cloud, try doing it system-by-system (or some other smaller unit), rather than all at once.

Second, favor reversibility.

Remember, writes Scott, “Irreversible interventions have irreversible consequences.” If you’re switching to a cloud environment, consider keeping your old servers around for a few months, just in case you need to roll back. If you’re launching a new site (perhaps in an A/B testing fashion for a pilot group), don’t destroy the old system — just in case. For programmers, Git and similar version-control systems are key to this process — and non-programmers can leverage the same idea in other contexts.

Three, plan on surprises.

Given a choice, “[c]hoose plans that allow the largest accommodation to the unforeseen.” If you’re planning a farm, choose and prepare land that can support a variety of crops. If you’re building an API, allow for flexibility in use — don’t try to lock developers into on way of doing things — APIs like JSON, for example, can be accessed by a wide variety of programming languages, and allow for much wider developer base. If you expect a maximum of 10 API calls per day per developer — make plans to handle 10,000, just in case. Cloud computing excels at this kind of surprise capacity scaling.

Four, plan on human inventiveness.

What is a liberal democracy?

First, of course, it’s important to define what a “liberal democracy” is. The term liberal, unfortunately, has acquired a negative connotation for many today, especially amongst conservatives in the United States.

But “liberal” in this sense is not the opposite of “conservative”; liberal instead is aligned with governance through public decision-making and public discussion. “Liberal democracies” are thus democracies where the majority of people are eligible to vote and where, generally, the “rule of law” is established through some form of constitution.

It is, in Stephen Turner’s definition, “government by discussion.” There is one exception: religion, because of lessons learned after centuries of religious warfare, is generally removed from the discussion as being incompatible with civil debate. This has been done either through explicit state neutrality (the First Amendment) or through the establishment of a single, state religion along with tolerance for other faiths. The United States is a liberal democracy; Saudi Arabia is not.

An illiberal democracy might be a society in which citizens vote, but the terms of the debate are constrained through propaganda, censorship, or theology. Thus, many illiberal states, like North Korea, claim to be “democratic,” but most citizens of liberal democracies would disagree.

The problem of expertise

If free discussion and debate is core to liberalism — as Turner, backed by old-school liberal theorists like John Stuart Mill, argue — then anything that interferes with public debate and decision-making also moves a society away from liberalism (note, once again, that this is not the opposite of conservatism in the modern sense).

In a classic liberal democracy, public opinion — influenced through civil discourse and debate — is the basis of political action. But how can one have an effective political discourse when only experts understand the terms of the debate? We can all understand and participate in — at least in Turner’s view — debates over, for example, the extent of the voting franchise (“votes for women!”), but how can the lay public effectively decide if tobacco ought to be classified as a drug? Or if the MMR vaccine causes autism or not? Or whether global climate change is real?

These kinds of questions require scientific evidence to fully answer, but that evidence is difficult for non-experts to fully assess. Without the subject-area knowledge, lay participants frequently over- or under-value key evidence, confuse correlation with causation, or simply fail to follow the science.

However, turning such decisions over to experts in the subject conflicts with a core ideal of a liberal democracy: that a public debate ought to determine public policy.

Trust

If we simply trusted experts, then practically, at least, this conflict would largely disappear. We could simply establish commissions or groups of experts to evaluate problems and then provide solutions — much as the European Union does it (though not without criticism).

But a number of factors have combined to create a sense of distrust of experts by the American public. DDT, Three Mile Island, and Bhopal damaged the trust in science of progressives; a rise in religiosity, growing dislike of government regulation, and an increasing perception that scientists are “liberal” (in the contemporary sense) correspondingly degraded conservatives’ trust in science.

As a result, it has become untenable to leave decisions on issues like global climate change in the hands of experts — but as a result, rational, logic-based discussion and debate by educated and informed participants — another core value of a liberal democracy — has become rare.

Solutions

Turner suggests that creating pseudo-juridical, adversarial debates by experts might increase trust in the results. After all, we trust a similar approach to administer the death penalty — but we certainly don’t trust the lawyers who control the process! It’s an interesting, if impractical, concept, partly implemented already through the tort system, but unlikely to be extended elsewhere.

Alternatively, Turner suggests we adopt European-style commissions, but that we make them accountable to the public for their decisions in some fashion. This is effectively the path that has been adopted domestically and internationally, although it is not without its controversies — and does little to resolve the tension inherent in experts making decisions instead of the lay public.

To re-include the public in expert decision-making — or at least to create a public capable of effectively reviewing and scrutinizing expert commissions — the only real solution I see is education. While this may be inadequate to turn average citizen into domain experts, it would at least help make citizens capable of evaluating and assessing experts themselves, along with the logical reasoning of their decisions, more effectively.

Conclusions

Although it feels like this conflict is new the tension between experts and public decision-makers is not unique to today’s liberal democracies. But I think Turner might be correct that the incredible complexity of today’s science and evidence has compounded the tension into a crisis.

Additionally, the long-standing exclusion of religion from anything but moral decision-making — or, alternatively, the extension of science into the realm of theology — has created a new level of crisis. Free discussion in the Millean mode is simply impossible when faith and theology fully determine the outcome for a sizable percentage of participants.

There is no simple solution for any of this. Education is helpful, but not decisive; transparent mechanisms of science and government also help, but are not determinative; and letters to the editor from distinguished scientists can only go so far in re-establishing scientific authority.

Bacon and Comte

Turner begins with Francis Bacon’s “The New Atlantis” (1627). Although Bacon’s work was more political theory than scientific article (“science” in its modern form did not yet exist, nor did “scientists”), he nonetheless put forward a theory of knowledge based on induction and articuled a view that valued the knowledge of experts — a knowledge based on experience rather than more traditional forms of authority (34). (What about Bacon vs. Edward Coke, proponent of common law and the rule of law?)

Blithly moving ahead to 1793 — when science had actually begin to emerge in a more recognizably modern form — Turner picks up the story again with Condorcet’s “promot[ion of] the idea that science was the engine of human progress.” Condorcet, says Turner, believed in science and its benefits, but also thought the “the production of these benefits required state action” (34).

Condorcet’s main focus of state action is education — but he acknowledged that the point of that education was to create “collective submission to reason and science.” Educated citizens would choose their “intellectual betters” as leaders — essentially a “regime of expert rule, with democratic consent” (35).

Saint-Simon and Comte

Turner argues that Saint-Cimon took the implications of Condorcet’s ideas — ”that social knowledge allowed for the replacement of politics” — and radicalized them (35). Saint-Simon believed in “scientists as the saviors of society,” and argued — in a pre-Marxist fashion — that “the rule of main over man would be replaced by the ‘administration of things’” (35).

Comte, secretary to Saint-Simon and the founder of the new discipline of “sociology,” turned Saint-Simon’s ideas into “Positivism,” a new philosophy of science and politics (35-36). Comte’s Positivism reject the “liberalism” of John Stuart Mill (and other English philosophers like John Locke) in favor of the rule of the expert (36). Science would provide the model “for overcoming the ‘anarchy of opinions’ by providing consensus” (36). The “authority of science,” he believed, ought to “be imposed on the ignorant, just as the dogmas of Catholicism had been so effectively imposed in the past” (37).

John Stuart Mill

In the mid-nineteenth century, Mill advocated “liberalism” — a political theory grounded in governance by discussion that invested power in the general public — as opposed to aristocrats, technocrats, or bureaucrats. But he was caught between his belief in free discourse as a model of liberal democracy, and his equally powerful belief that “the canons of induction lead to proven knowledge” (37). Mill never resolved this tension between lay decision-making and scientific truth-finding.

Pearson and Mach

Ernst Mach and Karl Pearson, writes Turner, are “transitional figures” between Comte and Communists theories of science of the 1930s (38). Both oriented science toward “efficiency.” Both were deeply concerned with ideas of consensus.

Pearson, in particular, believed in the power of the scientific method to “assure[] consensus without force” (38). But how can general citizens join this consensus? Again, like Comte, Pearson advocated both education and popularization — but only the experience of actually studying a small area of science closely could really inculcate the proper frame of scientific mind (39). If citizens could generally experience this too, it would “produce consensual politics without coercion” (39).

Science, Culture, and Politics

Do advances in science depend on cultural conditions? Or is science the “prime mover”? Philosophers like Alfred North Whitehead and socioligists like Sorokin and Max Weber saw Western civilization as enabling the growth of science, and not the reverse (40).

Early in the century, “efficiency” became the watchword, and scientific and engineering solutions were proposed as ways to resolve social issues. Otto Neurath and others argued that Socialism and the “planned economy” were scientific and efficient, and therefore both practical and desireable (40).

John Dewey promoted the experimental method as the best way to solve problems in human affairs, “replacing ‘custom’ and attachment to traditions, such as constitutional traditions” (40-41). But Dewey wanted the scientific spirit in politics, but not scientists themselves (41).

Max Weber dismissed the idea of scientists as technocratic replacements for politicians:

the qualities that make a man an excellent scholar and academic teacher are not the qualities make him a leader … specifically in politics (43).

The Impact of Marxism

Marxism itself was intended to be a scientific account of history and progress. After the Soviet Union began to put a version of Marxism into practice, early theoreticians in the USSR explicitly bound science to society, and argued that science itself was driven by “social formations and historical considerations” (43). For these theorists, “an autonomous realm of pure science was a sham and an ideological construction” (43).

Outside of the Soviet Union, “the Left” accepted the idea that science was not neutral — but also that rational, planned societies were the apotheosis of the scientific approach (44). During the Depression, many saw politicians — and democratic capitalism itself — as standing in the way of scientific progress (44).

Post-War Science Studies

Turner argues that the debate over the role of science in society was transformed after World War II for a variety of reasons:
The response of physicists to the Bomb, the coming of the Cold War, the betrayal of atomic secrets by scientists, the Oppenheimer case, the Lysenko affair (which finally discredited the Soviet model of science), and the rise of an aggresively anti-Stalinist Left transformed the debate (47).

The new, post-war world valorized science, but generally removed politics from explicit consideration — and the result was Thomas Kuhn’s seminal work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Additionally, if a core reason that copyright has always been compatible with the First Amendment is that it is a property right, then perhaps a way out of the conflict between privacy and freedom of speech and the press is to conceive of privacy in the same way — as a property right. Certainly it is already on its way there, as the “right of publicity” in many jurisdictions already implicitly does so, since it provides control over unauthorized commercial use by others.

What follows are three approaches the outline some of the benefits of doing exactly this.

Dissolving the Inkblot: Privacy as Property Right

Unsurprisingly, this is an approach libertarian thinkers have already explored. In a 1993 report for the Cato Institute, Sheldon Richman argues for a vision of privacy “that derives privacy rights from a Lockean framework based on each person’s property in his own life, liberty, and estate.” Richman grounds his vision of the right to privacy as a property right embedded in the Constitution:

That the propertarian model of privacy has the full force of the Constitution behind it is evident in the purposes listed in the preamble to the Constitution, in the recurring express references to property, and in the protection of unenumerated rights in the Ninth Amendment.

He additionally argues that viewing privacy as property is supported by older case law as well:

[I]n Boyd v. United States (1886), a search and seizure case involving a businessman, Justice Joseph Bradley wrote that the constitutional guarantees securing people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects transcend the concrete case and “apply to all invasions on the part of government and its employes of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging in his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.”

Richman argues that “propertarian privacy” provides a consistent philosophical and moral grounding for property rights that protects privacy without giving judges too much leeway:  ”To determine whether one has a right of privacy with respect to some act, a judge need only ask what the property rights are.” As a result, contraceptive use is protected through his right to privacy because “each party owns himself or herself. … The same is true … for persons who engage in consensual homosexual sodomy.” Child abuse — even in one’s own home — is not protected “because the child is a self-owner.” Abortion is generally protected because “the fetus comes into existence inside the body of a self-owner.” On the other hand, employers may ban smoking — even in an employee’s home — without violating their right to privacy because the “prospective employee can turn down the job.”

In regards to data privacy legislation, Richmond’s approach would generally not protect privacy unless contractual obligations were violated (this might be seen as protecting confidentiality):

A private firm compiles a computer data base on consumers in order to rent it to direct marketers. Privacy violation? Not if the information was originally provided freely by the consumers (or otherwise lawfully obtained) and all contractual restrictions are observed. But if information was given confidentially, divulgence should be actionable. To be sure, data can be misappropriated, stolen by computer hackers, or used in ways that violate contractual obligations. That is why there are criminal and civil courts.

The Property Rights Origins of Privacy Rights

In The Property Rights Origins of Privacy Rights, Mary Cholpecki explores the historical connections between property and privacy. She points to two English cases as examples of this. First, in Yovatt v. Winyard (1820), what I might call an early trade-secrets case, the court “extended property rights protections to cover personal secrets,” namely, secret formulas for medicines used by a competitor. Cholpecki writes:

Yovatt brings to light the interesting and important fact that “what we now call ‘unfair competition’ and ‘plagiarism’ and ‘privacy’ were all wrapped together, in Yovatt’s time, under the principle of ‘property.’” It was only later that these concepts were separated.

She then discusses Prince Albert v. Strange, a case from 1849 in which Strange is prohibited from selling copies of etchings he had catalogued for Prince Albert:

According to one commentator, the most significant aspect of this case and its underlying philosophy is that it rested on a right of privacy, which the court considered a type of property right. In fact, it appears that until 1890, no English court recognized the right to privacy independent of property rights.

Cholpecki blames Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ 1890 law review article for “divorcing privacy from its historical and intellectual partner, property rights.” Because of this, she argues, in subsequent cases the courts have “muddled the parameters of the right and allowed critics to argue that the right to privacy does not exist in the Constitution.”

She sees hope in the 1977 case of Moore v. City of East Cleveland, where a plurality of justices united in the ruling, some of the basis of a right to privacy and some on the basis of property rights:

The Moore case illustrates the interconnectedness between privacy and property rights. Given the same set of facts, four members of the Court believed privacy rights were jeopardized, while another believed property rights were threatened. Ultimately, the two segments came together to protect the rights at stake. … The most enduring protection for both rights is to view each as indispensable to the other.

Privacy As Intellectual Property?

In “Privacy As Intellectual Property?,” Pamela Samuelson explores the potential benefits and pitfalls of adopting a property-based approach to privacy protections.

First, she writes, viewing data about oneself as private property matches an intuition many of us already have. Since people already have the legal right to exclude people from access (journals locked in a desk drawer, papers stored at home in a file cabinet, etc.), “they may have a sense that they have a property right in the data as well as a legal right to restrict access to it” (1130). Data protection laws reinforce this intuitive sense.

This intuitive sense of property persists even though ownership of data is not the core legal framework in American law for dealing with privacy: “Indeed, the traditional view in American law is that information as such cannot be owned by any person” (1131). Although property rights are involved with Fourth Amendment protections, it is not a property right in the information per se, but rather a property right against trespass. The Fifth Amendment (against self-incrimination) protects a liberty interest in a kind of privacy right, but it is not a property right. If a doctor reveals confidential medical information to a newspaper, a patient’s rights “would arise under contract or privacy law, not from the existence of any property rights in this information” (1131).

Samuelson suggests that granting individuals property rights in their own data might force companies to internalize the costs of privacy — if individuals retain property rights over their own information, even if gathered without their intervention, the companies would need to compensate them (and get permission) for the use by buying the rights, or forgo using the personal data. It would also have the side benefit of potentially increasing the quality of data collected, since individuals and companies would each have an incentive to make sure data is accurate (1133).

Perhaps most importantly, taking a property rights approach would allow market forces and market efficiencies handle privacy concerns, without neglecting the particular desires of individual people, and without extensive (and potentially expensive) government regulations (1135-36).

Conclusions

Both Cholpecki and Richmond write from a libertarian perspective, and both believe that connecting the right to privacy with property rights will helps unify conservative and liberal positions into one that can have positive outcomes for everyone. Samuelson approaches the issue from a critical perspective, but outlines many of the important benefits that a “privacy as property” approach might give — and notes that, especially as many American today dislike government-run anything, a system of privacy rights that leverages and extends existing property rules and regulations would likely achieve significant support.

Breaking the Vicious Cycle, Stephen Breyer

In Breaking the Vicious Circle, Justice Stephen Breyer tackles the problem of regulation and risk in the American context:

Justice Breyer identifies several systemic problems that plague the regulatory process in the United States. He discusses how public (mis)perceptions, congressional (over)reaction, and technical (un)certainty create a “vicious circle” that increasingly undermines the legitimacy of the regulatory process.  —  Eric J. Gouvin, A Square Peg In A Vicious Circle: Stephen Breyer’s Optimistic Prescription For The Regulatory Mess

Breyer complains that the current approach to risk regulation is irrational. Because the perception of risk drives voters, and therefore public officials, to focus on specific potential harms, there is little appropriate “risk-benefit” assessment employed.

For example, regulators may seek to clean up every aspect of a potential agent — like asbestos — while neglecting to consider whether the benefit of complete cleanup is worth the risk, either monetary or physical:

For example, “cleaning up” asbestos in public buildings causes asbestos fibers that would have remained harmlessly in place to become airborne, increasing significantly the chance of those fibers lodging in workers’ lungs and creating medical problems. (Gouvin, n. 11, 475)

Breyer puts together a table showing that some regulations with costs of $10 million to $5.7 trillion per life saved. In short, the “marginal cost of extra health may daunt all but the most zealous” (Stephen F. Williams, “Risk Regulations and its Hazards,” 1499).

1995′s approach is also uncoordinated. Breyer points out that regulations on space heaters cost $100,000 per life saved, while bans on DES in cattle feed cost roughly $125 million “per statistical life” (22). Stephen Williams explains that Breyer sees this as a “wasteful allocation of resources” that over invests in certain areas and neglects others (1498). In other words, with limited resources available, such uncoordinated and disconnected spending fails to save the maximum number of possible lives per available dollar — and little has changed in 2012.

Regulations also overlap in unanticipated (but likely not unanticipatable) ways:

Proposed rules concerning disposal of sewer sludge, designed to save one statistical life every five years, would encourage waste incineration likely to cause two statistical deaths annually (22).

In other words, disparate agencies assessing and regulating risk tend to focus on their own peculiar zones of risk, and fail to appreciate the big picture of interacting regulations.

In summary, Breyer categorizes the various regulatory failures like those described above as (1) tunnel vision, (2) random agenda selection, and (3) inconsistency.

The Source of the Problem

Irrational regulations emerge from a triumvirate of sources: (1) inaccurate public perceptions; (2) congressional action and reaction, instead of planning; and (3) uncertainties in the regulatory process.

First, even if lay people do think rationally about possible risks — and Breyer thinks they tend to — they “are unlikely to acquire a full grasp of the relevant facts” (Williams, 1500). The lay public typically gets its information from press sources, and the press focuses on the dramatic. A focus on toxic-waste dumps, for example, along with a presentation of higher-than-average cancer rates in nearby areas, may conflate causation with correlation and lead to an irrational (if viewed from a societal perspective, anyway) demand to regulate toxic-waste dumps to reduce the incidence of cancer.

Second, Congress tends to be reactive to what they perceive as voter’s current demands — since these demands are what get them re-elected. (The House, which its short, 2-year election cycle, is even more prone to this than the Senate, which grants 6 years between elections). And with changing Congressional representation, agencies may receive vastly different, and potentially incompatible, regulatory missions.

Third, the regulatory process itself is uncertain, because the science of risk is uncertain. It is essentially impossible to set up a double-blind, controlled study of the effects of small amounts of benzene on humans over a 60-year period. Instead, researchers use short-term, high-dose animal studies and then extrapolate to the long-term effects on humans.

But rats are not humans, and high-doses of chemicals do not necessarily cause the same effects as low-doses. As Breyer observes, there is “no consistent scientific rational for assuming a linear relation between dose and response” (44).

Statistical and epidemiological studies can get around these particular problems, but introduce their own potential issues — especially around the problems of distinguishing between causation and correlation. Also — impossible to isolate all variable. Variables are never truly independent. Best to look for lots of study — meta-studies — an rather inductive science.

Breyer’s Solution

Breyer has no real solution to the technical problems of the science, other than to let technically trained people — those who understand the problems with the science — make the decisions. He does have many suggestions about how to structure a bureaucracy/technocracy that can better weigh, assess, and decide on policies based on the data that can be generated with today’s science.

His overall solution is quintessentially technocratic, and very much reminiscent of a more European model of regulatory authority. He wants, in the words of Todd Zubler, “an elite and insulated cadre of civil servants” (244) — experts in both science and government — to “unite[] political power with wisdom.” (Breyer, x) This Socratic unity, as opposed to the voting booth, is what creates trust; it “must be central in any effort to create the politics of trust” (81).

More specifically, Zubler says,

Breyer wants to establish a new and prestigious career path by which civil servants could develop regulatory expertise across a number of different governmental agencies. These experienced bureaucrats could then form a small, centralized administrative group that could coordinate and rationalize the nation’s regulatory agenda. Such an organization, according to Breyer, would combine the expertise, broad vision, political insulation, and interagency jurisdiction which are all so lacking in the current system. (244)

Issues

Zubler worries that Breyer’s new centralized bureaucracy goes too far. Other forces can also protect people from risk, including the market and the judicial system:

But … regulation is only needed when market and common law mechanisms fail. To push bureaucratic regulation beyond those situations threatens individual liberty and freedom. (247)

Put differently, Breyer’s European-style, top-down, technocratic system brings efficiency and rationality to bear of the problem of risk. But — interestingly for a lawyer and judge — it neglects the bottom-up tools that are core to the American approach, such as tort law and free-market competition. He proposes a grand, top-down restructuring that does nothing to adjust and improve an individual’s ability to assess and manage risk, such as improved labeling and consumer information and better access to the courts.

The Judiciary

What would be the role of the judiciary in an America where technocratic elites are making regulatory decisions?

Medical device manufacturers have already argued — and won — the case that FDA-approval of medical devices preempts tort lawsuits (Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312 (2008)). On the other hand, drug manufacturers lost their bid for preemption in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).

Would — or should — Breyer’s approach preempt lawsuits? For maximum efficiency, it should — but the American system is not about efficiency at all. It’s about checking the power of any one part of government. The judiciary’s role since Marbury v. Madison, at least, is to check the rest of government. But while eliminating this check would fundamentally alter the balance of power, not doing so would severely undermine many gains in efficiency.

Interestingly, Breyer’s unelected, technocratic elite are reminiscent of the federal judiciary itself. It too consists of specialists (in law) who are unelected (they appointed by the President) and unaccountable (except via impeachment, federal judges serve for life). But the judiciary is considered the third branch of American government, and these special attributes serve as its means of checking and balancing the executive and legislative branches. Extending these attributes to Breyer’s new cadre might well create the equivalent of a fourth branch — and would anything less prove effective enough to be worth the effort?

Liberal or Conservative?

Finally, I wonder how to characterize Breyer’s proposal: is it liberal, conservative, or something else? In many respects, his solution is extremely conservative: it presumes a distrust of the public that is reminiscent of conservative distrust of poor voters, for example. But it invokes a liberal (in the modern sense), governmental solution to the problem, one that is opposed to contemporary Republican views that government is the problem, not the solution. On the other hand, a more efficient regulatory system could eliminate government waste, reform tort law, and free business from burdensome, pointless regulations. A more efficient government is a cheaper government that would require fewer taxes — a popular conservative goal.

Depending on the details, then, Breyer’s reforms could appeal to both Democrats and Republicans — but certainly not to modern libertarians, or to anyone opposed to government on principle. It is, in a sense, anti-individualist, and deeply dismissive of old liberal notions of market-based corrections and individual responsibility.

Conclusions

Still, gains in efficiency and effectiveness would not require such radical changes. Improved cross-agency coordination and more inclusion of scientific experts — perhaps with a more limited version of Breyer’s technocratic bureau — might provide major gains without requiring fundamental readjustments of the American system.

My short opinion? Breyer effectively identified major systemic problems with the American regulatory system, but his full proposed solution is simply impractical in the United States (perhaps especially in 2012) — but more limited versions would still provide useful reforms. But any of this would require greater trust and respect in science — and a philosophical uniting of virtue and wisdom by scientists is not enough to overcome the current anti-intellectual and anti-science beliefs prevalent today in the American Right:

“The dangers of carbon dioxide? Tell that to a plant, how dangerous carbon dioxide is.”  —  2012 GOP presidential candidate Rick Santorum.

The Master Switch by Tim Wu

Peter Decherney, Nathan Ensmenger, and Christopher S. Yoo recently published an article, Are Those Who Ignore History Doomed to Repeat it?, on Tim Wu‘s book, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires. Wu argues that communications technologies follow “the Cycle,” beginning as open systems, only to be closed by corporate moguls — and then re-opening again as the Cycle starts anew after a new innovation emerges. Decherney, Ensmenger, and Yoo do not completely reject Wu’s thesis, but they do argue that Wu’s focus on individual actors neglects the complexities of other market players (advertisers, for example), government agencies, and other supply- and demand-side actors.

Wu’s thesis rests on the powerful idea that we can improve our future by learning from the past, an approach that is core to my own historical focus on the telegraph in the nineteenth century — and the lessons that it can teach us about current and future technologies like the Internet.

Wu’s vision of influential corporate moguls whose visionary approaches unify and then close communications networks is seductive in the same way that our vision of a Romantic author is (Americans especially seem to cling to this idealistic notion). For example, it’s tempting, but equally misleading, to view Star Wars as the work of George Lucas, forgetting — or eliding — the number of other figures who played major or minor roles in its creation and production. The same is true of any technological development.

Decheney, et al. also make the convincing argument that, even if we focus only on larger-than-life individuals (Alexander Graham Bell, former AT&T President Theodore Vail, financier J.P. Morgan, and so on), we have to take account of visionary individuals who have pushed for openness instead: in the Internet age, that includes Richard Stallman and Vint Cert. They write:

Clearly, bold leadership was not the exclusive province of the established corporate interests.

Many other have tried for unified historical approaches, and visionary works like Wu’s are powerful and useful for understanding the past. However, write Decheney, et al.:

History is notoriously untidy, and all too often real-world facts stubbornly refuse to conform to what would otherwise be a terrific story.

Large, sweeping accounts of historical development give a readily graspable broad picture, and (hopefully) provide useful guidance, at least on large-scale decision-making. But this broad guidance can be misleading, if seductive to policmakers seeking “simple policy inferences” that can be readily employed and discussed without needing a strong understanding of the underlying concepts and factors. But these “sweeping and categorical” understandings can produce distored perspectives by politicos — think of former Alaskan Senator Ted Stevens statement:

The internet is not a big truck. It’s a series of tubes,

Adding complexity can make decisionmaking more, well, complex, but it can also “provide a better foundation for sound public policy.” That, hopefully, is what I will be producing with my work on privacy and the telegraph in the nineteenth century.

Specifically, the Supreme Court ruled 5-2 against the old Charles River Bridge Company, saying that Massachusetts had not violated the federal constitution’s Contracts Clause — a victory, it was held at the time, for state’s rights (as was Dred Scott). Justice Taney, generally very conservative and pro-property rights (and incidentally in favor of preserving slavery, as abolition would deprive owners of property), ruled against the contracts claim of the private corporation in favor of the public good:

While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also have rights, and that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation. Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. at 548.

Taney aligned the “public good” with progress and technological improvements. Ruling in favor of the entrenched Charles River Bridge Corporation would mean that the country would “be thrown back to the improvements of the last century, and obliged to stand still.” Id. If an exclusive monopoly were upheld, then incumbent highway corporations would hold back development of new railroads and canals, which were booming as the new technologies of the nineteenth centuries.

New developments and new approaches had permitted a new corporation to build a new bridge at a lower cost — and to make it free within a few years of its opening, while still turning a profit for its investors. But in doing so, the profit-making potential of the old bridge was destroyed (although investors had already made back their initial investment multiple times over).

But hadn’t the old company taken a risk initially? Didn’t its investors deserve to reap their new profits because they had taken the risk initially? Wouldn’t setting a precedent that their state-granted monopoly could be limited later actually inhibit future investment?

If these questions all seem rather familiar in the 21st century, it’s because these are the same kinds of arguments advanced by patent and copyright holders today. Pharmaceutical companies want their patent monopolies to extend further, and argue that failing to grant a sufficient monopoly would inhibit development and investment. Music and movie companies argue that their copyright monopolies should extend even further than it does now — because otherwise creation and investment would suffer.

Taney said “no” to this argument in 1837. I’ll ask the obvious question, then: did this decision to limit a monopoly contract reduce investment and technological development in the nineteenth century? The (equally obvious) answer is, “no”: the nineteenth century gave us railroads, the telegraph, the telephone, and much, much more. If there’s anything we can learn from Taney’s 1837 decision, it’s that minimizing monopoly rights does not inhibit development — and, I think, the reverse is even more likely.

It’s a lesson we would do well to keep in mind when considering the length and extent of patent and copyright monopolies.