Underdetermination and the balance between religion and science

The Duhem-Quine thesis, when simplified, explains how a given set of facts can produce more than one apparently true conclusion: essentially, different background assumptions lead to different outcomes. A related concept is known as underdetermination: that a given set of evidence can be explained by more than one–potentially conflicting–theory. How does this impact the relationship between science and religion?

Objectivity, science, and (a)political action

Theodore M. Porter, in Trust in Numbers, argues that the American distrust of elites–and of government itself–has led to a focus on “mechanical objectivity,” or rules to make decisions. In many ways similar to what American jurists call “procedural due process,” the idea of to diminish the necessity of personal judgement in favor of predictable, “transparent” processes and thus lessen the number of disputes over the outcomes of a bureacratic decision.

Benefits of viewing the right to privacy as a property right

If a core reason that copyright has always been compatible with the First Amendment is that it is a property right, then perhaps a way out of the conflict between privacy and freedom of speech and the press is to conceive of privacy in the same way–as a property right. Certainly it is already on its way there, as the “right of publicity” in many jurisdictions already implicitly does so, since it provides control over unauthorized commercial use by others.

Reforming government regulations: Stephen Breyer’s technocratic solutions

In Breaking the Vicious Circle, Justice Stephen Breyer tackles the problem of regulation and risk in the American context: “Justice Breyer identifies several systemic problems that plague the regulatory process in the United States. He discusses how public (mis)perceptions, congressional (over)reaction, and technical (un)certainty create a “vicious circle” that increasingly undermines the legitimacy of the regulatory process.”

Is everything old new again? Learning from the history of technology

Tim Wu argues that com­mu­ni­ca­tions tech­nolo­gies fol­low “the Cycle,” begin­ning as open sys­tems, only to be closed by cor­po­rate moguls – and then re-opening again as the Cycle starts anew after a new inno­va­tion emerges. Decherney, Ensmenger, and Yoo do not com­pletely reject Wu’s the­sis, but they do argue that Wu’s focus on indi­vid­ual actors neglects the com­plex­i­ties of other mar­ket play­ers (adver­tis­ers, for exam­ple), gov­ern­ment agen­cies, and other sup­ply– and demand-side actors.

Protecting vested interests in the face of new technology: the case of the Charles River Bridge

New developments and new approaches had permitted a new corporation to build a new bridge at a lower cost–and to make it free within a few years of its opening, while still turning a profit for its investors. But in doing so, the profit-making potential of the old bridge was destroyed (although investors had already made back their initial investment multiple times over).

But hadn’t the old company taken a risk initially? Didn’t its investors deserve to reap their new profits because they had taken the risk initially? Wouldn’t setting a precedent that their state-granted monopoly could be limited later actually inhibit future investment?

What is the First Amendment?

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

The (scientific) development of common-law precedent

One of the defining characteristics of common law (as opposed to civil law) is the binding nature of precedent, sometimes referred to by its Latin name of stare decisis. But before the seventeenth century, the defining characteristic of English common law was not this one, but rather that common law reflected universal and customary law, and as such the goal was for judges to utilize previous decisions as merely guides to help them get closer to the true (unwritten) laws of England, not as binding in themselves.

Privacy and the silo/filter/echo problem

The push for “privacy” that demands an ability to allow us to restrict who sees what–enabled, for example, by new tools in Facebook and Google+–also creates and reinforces silos (filter bubbles, echo chambers) that prevent our exposure to different ideas. But this move highlights potential conflicts between a number of rights: freedom of association and freedom of speech and the press (both from the First Amendment) and rights to privacy (from the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments). What is this conflict? Is it real? How can we (begin) to resolve it?

Narrative, free will, and legal responsibility: reading Cathy Gere reading Michael Gazzaniga

Michael Gazzaniga suggests that his finding that we construct post-hoc narratives potentially undermines the criminal requirement of mens rea (the “guilty mind” element of most crimes): if our actions are in many situations automatic, and our explanations of them–our decision-making moral sense, as it were–only post-hoc, then “‘My brain made me do it’ threatens to become a get-out-of-jail-free card available to everyone, not just to sufferers of fetal alcohol syndrome or schizophrenia.”

On “The Role of Technology in Human Affairs”

In The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom, Yochai Benkler discusses his vision of the role of technology in historical change. He rejects an overly deterministic vision of technology (which he connects with Lewis Mumford and Marshall McLuhan), but also rejects a view of technology as immaterial to a society’s direction.