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history
Underdetermination and the balance between religion and science
The Duhem-Quine thesis, when simplified, explains how a given set of facts can produce more than one apparently true conclusion: essentially, different background assumptions lead to different outcomes. A related concept is known as underdetermination: that a given set of evidence can be explained by more than one–potentially conflicting–theory. How does this impact the relationship between science and religion?
Objectivity, science, and (a)political action
Theodore M. Porter, in Trust in Numbers, argues that the American distrust of elites–and of government itself–has led to a focus on “mechanical objectivity,” or rules to make decisions. In many ways similar to what American jurists call “procedural due process,” the idea of to diminish the necessity of personal judgement in favor of predictable, “transparent” processes and thus lessen the number of disputes over the outcomes of a bureacratic decision.
David Noble on “The Religion of Technology”
In The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention, David Noble investigates the Western relationship between religion and technology.
Four planning rules to avoid project disasters
One key reason to study history? To learn from the past: (1) take small steps, (2) favor reversibility, (3) plan on surprises, and (4) plan on human inventiveness.
The problem of expertise in a liberal democracy
If free discussion and debate is core to liberalism–as Turner, backed by old-school liberal theorists like John Stuart Mill, argue–then anything that interferes with public debate and decision-making also moves a society away from liberalism (note, once again, that this is not the opposite of conservatism in the modern sense).
Stephen Turner describes “The Social Study of Science before Kuhn”
Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions–in many ways established the modern field of science studies. Stephen Turner provides a brief, socioligist’s version of the lead-up to Kuhn’s seminal book.
Problems with treating privacy as a property right
One approach to dealing with privacy would be to extend property rights to cover information or personal data, rather as copyright, patents, trademarks, and other forms of intellectual property extended physical rules into the realm of the intangible. While there are undoubtedly benefits to this, there are limitations as well
Privacy and the First Amendment: privacy as property?
In Copyright and the First Amendment: The Unexplored, Unbroken Historical Practice, Terry Hart does an excellent job of exploring why the First Amendment has never been held to interfere with the enforcement of copyright, including pre-publication injunctive relief.
Freedom to contract at the end of the nineteenth century
In Kermit Hall’s words, the nineteenth century saw the “triumph of contract” over property, tort, and equity, as the law came “to ratify those forms of inequality that the market system produces.” (196-97) The early twentieth century continued this–at least until the Great Depression and Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal forced the court to reconsider.
Post-war contract law in the nineteenth century
In many respects, the so-called “black codes” put in place in the South immediately after the Civil War exemplify the potential extremes of nineteenth-century contract law.
Contract law in the antebellum 19th century
The common law before the nineteenth century required contracts to be fair and reasonable: a “sound price warrants a sound commodity.” But by mid-century, William Wetmore Story’s famous treatise on contracts recognized that this basic understanding had radically altered. Contracts now required only “mutual assent of the parties” and “valuable consideration.”
Is everything old new again? Learning from the history of technology
Tim Wu argues that communications technologies follow “the Cycle,” beginning as open systems, only to be closed by corporate moguls – and then re-opening again as the Cycle starts anew after a new innovation emerges. Decherney, Ensmenger, and Yoo do not completely reject Wu’s thesis, but they do argue that Wu’s focus on individual actors neglects the complexities of other market players (advertisers, for example), government agencies, and other supply– and demand-side actors.
If the Fourteenth Amendment didn’t exist, could Obama still be President? (Yes)
Periodically various lay people attempt to interpret the law in ways that fit their version of (un)reality. While I appreciate the mainstream media simply ignoring these people (in general), it can occasionally be educational to refute its points as if they were logical and rational. A good example of this is the lawsuit Gordon Warren Epperly filed in Alaska challenging President Obama’s inclusion on the 2012 presidential ballot. It shows a fuzzy grasp of the law, legal terminology, logic, and history (a little reading of case law is a dangerous thing!), but pointing out some of its flaws can help illustrate these concepts.
Protecting vested interests in the face of new technology: the case of the Charles River Bridge
New developments and new approaches had permitted a new corporation to build a new bridge at a lower cost–and to make it free within a few years of its opening, while still turning a profit for its investors. But in doing so, the profit-making potential of the old bridge was destroyed (although investors had already made back their initial investment multiple times over).
But hadn’t the old company taken a risk initially? Didn’t its investors deserve to reap their new profits because they had taken the risk initially? Wouldn’t setting a precedent that their state-granted monopoly could be limited later actually inhibit future investment?
Federal common law in the nineteenth century
When the United States Constitution bound the states together in 1789, the common law (in sense #2)–inherited largely from England–was slowly but inexorably being replaced by statutory laws that often, but not always, codified earlier practices.
